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INTRODUCTION 
According to Aristotle, "There are only two parts to a speech: 
you make a statement and you prove it." All debate is based on 
this theory, however, the process is not as simplistic as Aristotle's 
statement would indicate. Debate is more than a cumulative 
stacking of statements and proofs; "it involves the clash of 
arguments and ideas, of strategies and tactics."^ It is a process 
2 
in which opposing sides struggle in verbal controversy. 
Debate is one of man's oldest activities. When two primitive 
men attempted to lay claim to the same territory or the same food, 
a debate undoubtedly ensued. Debate was a highly polished art 
among the ancient Greeks. When nobles disagreed, they could debate 
3 
their proposals before the king who acted as a judge. Any time 
a man has had to compare alternative situations, the merits of those 
1 
Roy V. Wood, Strategic Debate (Skokie, 111., 1975), p. 16. 
2 
Eugene R. Moulton, The Dynamics of Debate (New York, 1966), 
p. 4. 
3 
James M. Murphy and Jon M, Ericson, The Debater's Guide 
(Indianapolis, 1961), p, 13, 
1 
2 
situations may have been debated with another person or within 
himself. 
Debate is an integral part of our American society. It is 
a part of our tradition. "A succession of great debates have 
crystalized the thinking of citizens and...shaped the course of 
4 
our nation." Landmark debates have included those at the Con­
stitutional Convention, the Webster-Hayne confrontations, the 
Lincoln-Douglas debates and the Kennedy-Nixon television clashes. 
Our legislative bodies frequently employ debates in resolving 
issues. The right to free speech allows us to propose a new 
solution, to debate an issue, or to defend the status quo. 
Debate is a viable intercollegiate academic activity. Through 
debate research, students learn to analyze and organize material. 
During case formulation and actual debates they develop standards 
for evaluating evidence and discover logical connections. Since 
debate is a fluid situation, students must learn to adapt quickly. 
If their ideas are to be heard and to be accepted they must also 
learn the techniques of effective public address. This training 
is not something that will be filed away after college is completed, 
but training that will better equip them to live in American society. 
4 
James H. McBath (ed.). Argumentation and Debate: Principles 
and Practices (New York, 1963), p. 3. 
3 
Hopefully, debate will provide the initial motivation for continuing 
inquiry into controversial and significant public issues. 
The first academic debate in the United States was a form of 
"syllogistic disputation" similar to that of the Middle Ages. 
Early in the 18th Century students took the lead in establishing 
5 
a more flexible format that was better suited to the times. 
Since the beginning of the 19th Century additional elements have 
been introduced into academic debate such as tournaments, inter­
national debates, forensic honoraries, and new forms of debate 
(p. 14). A continual process of redefinition and refinement has 
occurred. 
As debate has developed, so too have the options open to the 
negative and affirmative teams. No longer is a traditional plan-
meets-need case the only affirmative option. They may also run 
comparative advantage, criteria or alternative justification cases. 
Currently the four major negative case structures are direct 
refutation, defense of the status quo, repairs of the status quo 
and the counterplan. Of these, the counterplan is the most con­
troversial . 
5 
David Potter, "The Debate Tradition" in Argumentation and 
Debate: Principles and Practice, ed. James H. McBath (New York, 
1963), p. 32. 
4 
In a counterplan, which has also been known as a "counter­
proposal" or a "counter proposition", the negative team, rather 
than directly refuting the affirmative plan, elects to present a 
plan of its own. Through the implementation of a counterplan, 
debate changes from a bipolar situation with participants arguing 
for or against a single solution to a more flexible situation which 
permits a multi-sided examination of the problem. In addition, it 
allows the negative an option for a status quo which may be hard 
to defend. 
Debate theory often lags behind debate practice and such is the 
case with the counterplan. Though counterplans were discussed in 
an article by Lambertson in 1943, at that time debate teams were 
just beginning to formulate concrete, concise plans and counter-
plans were almost non-existant.^ The debate texts of the 1960's 
contained little information about counterplans and views of them 
were not positive. They were considered unusual techniques ^ and 
g 
too risky because the negative had to accept the burden of proof. 
6 
"Plan and Counter-Plan in a Question of Policy", Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, XXIX (1943), 48-52. 
7 
Murphy and Ericson, p. 55. 
8 
Otto F. Bauer, Fundamentals of Debate (Glenview, 111., 1966), 
p. 39. 
5 
Debate judges were unimpressed with counterplans not "because 
there [was] anything wrong with them but because they [were] so 
9 
poorly done." Terry, in 1970, felt a counterplan should be used 
only when "the negative is truly convinced that the status quo is 
inherently defective."Most judges are psychologically 'turned 
off by the counterplan and thus it is the least desirable" 
negative strategy in debating a traditional affirmative case (p. 7). 
Even as recently as 1975, Wood said counterplans were considered 
relatively uncommon and judges were biased against them because this 
was a strategy usually used by teams who wished to trick their 
opponents (p. 121). 
Though the predominate theoretical view has been against counter-
plans, there have been a few articles and a text which have looked 
at them from a positive, instructional perspective.^^ While counter-
plan theory has lagged, counterplan use has increased to such a 
9 
David W. Shephard and Paul H. Cashman, A Handbook for 
Beginning Debaters (Minneapolis, 1966), p. 63. 
10 
Donald R. Terry (ed.). Modern Debate Case Techniques 
(Skokie, 111., 1970), p. 7. 
11 
Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer, "A General Theory 
of the Counterplan", Journal of the American Forensic Association, 
XII (1975), 70-79; James F. Klumpp, Bernard L. Brock, James W. Chesebro 
and John F. Cragan, "Implications of a Systems Model of Analysis on 
Argumentation Theory," Journal of the American Forensic Association, 
XI (1974),1-7; Deborah Elsie Ziegler, "Competitive Policy Systems 
6 
degree that the questionnaires for the 1974, 1975, and 1977 
National Debate Tournament Booklet of Judges have included questions 
on counterplans. 
It appears that counterplans have become a viable negative 
strategy but there is a lack of consistent counterplan criteria 
and techniques for debaters to follow. In addition, there is a 
controversy among judges about the acceptability of the counter-
plan. The latter is compounded by a disagreement as to whether 
counterplans should be judged by traditional debate theory or 
systems theory. 
With those problems in mind literature on counterplans and 
National Debate Tournament judging philosophy sheets have been 
surveyed for the purpose of clarifying this negative strategy. 
It is hoped that by combining judges' views and written theory 
the lag between debate theory and debate practice will be decreased. 
and the Counterplan," Issues (March, 1974), and Gregory W. 
Trianosky, "Counterplan as a Competitive System," Issues (May, 
1974 in Advanced Debate: Readings in Theory, Practice and Teaching, 
ed. David A. Thomas (Skokie, 111., 1974); Bernard L. Brock, 
James W. Chesebro, John F. Cragan and James F. Klumpp, Public 
Policy Decision-Making: Systems Analysis and Comparative Advantages 
Debate (New York, 1973). 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Theories 
There are two major theories of debate: traditional and 
General Systems Theory. The most fundamental difference between 
the two lies in "the points of judgment upon which policy judg-
12 
ments are based." 
Traditional theory focuses on a particular problem and solu­
tions. The causal argument and inherency are of vital importance. 
A traditional stock issues case, whether affirmative or negative, 
must be structured to show (1) the evils or problems of the status 
quo, (2) that these problems are produced by causes that can be 
remedied, (3) that the policy or action proposed will remedy the 
problems and (4) that the remedy is workable and practical. In a 
counterplan debate, the negative will usually accept the affir­
mative's designation of the problem area and then try to prove 
advantages for their plan in terms of remedying the problem, 
workability and practicality. In other words, they will integrate 
their plan with the affirmative case. 
12 
James F. Klumpp, et al., p. 3. 
7 
8 
General Systems Theory debate focuses on a range of alter­
native policy options. Rather than subscribing to a single cause 
of a problem it recognizes multiple causality. The proper policy 
is not related to a single cause but there is a choice of alter­
native causes, any one of which may have the same end result 
(equifinality). At the same time any one cause may have multiple 
effects and the value of each effect must be considered. The 
question of the permanence of the problem which has been isolated 
by the affirmative and the proof that the plan will meet the need 
become probability arguments. In other words, they indicate that, 
given these factors, the undesirable effect will be diminished 
with a change but the change need not be that designated by the 
13 affirmative team. 
Types of Counterplans 
There are three types of counterplans: conditional, systems 
theory and straight. 
When employing a conditional counterplan, the negative 
"maintains that the status quo is functioning adequately but even if 
it were not, their plan would be more beneficial than the affirmative 
13 
Ibid., 1-7. 
9 
,.14 
plan. In a systems theory counterplan situation, the negative 
is not required to concede the affirmative "need" or to address 
the same areas as the affirmative case. They can draw from a wide 
range of potential counterplans as long as they are competitive 
with the affirmative proposal. 
The straight, or standard traditional counterplan can be sub­
divided into contingent or non-contingent counterplans. A con­
tingent counterplan is dependent upon the affirmative plan. It 
employs all of the planks of that plan but implementation. Thus, 
the same advantages are accrued, but the plan might be implemented 
at the state level rather than at the federal level. A non-
contingent counterplan extends beyond the scope of the affirmative 
plan. For example, the affirmative may propose implementation of 
a federal minimum annual income program for medical personnel 
through the use of vouchers for general medical services. The 
negative will then counterplan by implementing prepaid group practice 
at the state level in addition to cash assistance. Both achieve 
the same advantage--guaranteed income and necessary medical assis-
15 
tance—but through different means. 
14 
Ziegler, p. 163. 
15 
Ibid. 
10 
Need Analysis 
When considering counterplan use, the negative debate team will 
adapt one of three strategies to analyze the need areas specified 
in the first affirmative constructive speech. The negative may 
(1) accept the entire need as defined by the affirmative, (2) 
accept it in part, or (3) say that the affirmative has defined the 
need incorrectly and present their own analysis of need. The first 
of these alternatives has been the most commonly employed. When 
the negative accepts the affirmative need, they then show that there 
is a better solution which is not possible under the affirmative 
plan. This solution must correct the same problems as the affirma­
tive case. The negative must be careful that the counterplan deals 
only with the problems specifically stated by the affirmative and 
n o t  w i t h  p r o b l e m s  " i t  w i s h e s  t h e  a f f i r m a t i v e  h a d  r a i s e d . I f  
the negative adopts the second strategy and accepts a portion of the 
need, they must refute the remainder of the affirmative need con­
tentions. The third strategy, non-acceptance of the affirmative need, 
is employed if the negative believes that the affirmative has in­
adequately analyzed the present system or if they wish to deal with 
other problems within the status quo. 
16 
Robert F. Newman, The Pittsburgh Code for Academic Debate 
(Pittsburgh, 1964), p. 21. 
17 
Bauer, p. 39. 
n 
Requirements 
Competitive. ^Any counterplan presented by the negative must 
be competitive with the affirmative proposal. The counterplan 
can be functionally competitive, or structurally or philosophically 
substitutive. Systems theory defines "competitive" as mutually 
exclusive and/or more desireable when adopted alone than if adopted 
simultaneously with the affirmative plan. 
A "functionally competitive" counterplan will achieve the same 
goals as the affirmative plan and be the superior option. In a 
"structurally substitutive" counterplan, the "laws in which the two 
18 
policy options are embodied logically contradict one another." 
It would be impossible to adopt and implement both simultaneously. 
In a "philosophically substitutive" counterplan the adoption of 
one plan is philosophically inconsistent with the adoption of the 
other plan. For instance, one plan may give people a minimum 
guaranteed annual income, while the other provides additional jobs 
so that people can earn a minimum annual income (p. 166). Tra­
ditional debate theorists, who have been in the majority, feel 
19 a competitive counterplan must correct the same problems and/or 
18 
Trianosky, p. 165. 
19 
Wood, p. 124. 
12 
20 
accrue the affirmative advantages. The counterplan is com­
petitive in that it offers an alternative solution. 
Under the systems theory definitions if a counterplan is 
"mutually exclusive" it cannot exist simultaneously with the affir­
mative plan. Mutual exclusivity can be proved by the negative 
without acknowledging criticisms of the status quo and without 
dealing with the problem areas the affirmative has established. 
To fulfill the second systems theory criterion, that of being "more 
desirable when implemented alone rather than when implemented 
simultaneously with the affirmative", it is unnecessary for the 
negative to accept any of the affirmative analysis or even deal with 
the problem areas cited by the affirmative. They may not, however, 
ignore the affirmative because they must prove their plan is more 
21 
desireable than simultaneous enactment of both plans. 
Non-topical. A second requirement for the counterplan is that 
it be non-topical. If it in any way fulfills all of the require­
ments of the resolution or the implications of the debate topic, it 
can be construed as support for the proposition. The negative 
need not vary more than one of the major terms of the proposition; 
20 
Ziegler, p. 161. 
21 
Lichtman and Rohrer, pp. 5-7. 
13 
however, the change must be significant. For instance, 50 states 
acting in a similar manner is not substantially different than a 
federal government edict. 
Prima facie. When the negative presents a counterplan it must 
contain the prima facie elements of harm, significance, and inherency 
22 
(uniqueness). The negative then accepts the burden of proof to 
demonstrate that its plan is workable, practical and more desirable 
than the affirmative proposal. It loses the presumption of the status 
quo. The negative must be careful not to confuse the counterplan with 
the adjustment and/or repairs case, which accepts the status quo 
with modifications, as a policy alternative to the affirmative plan. 
In summary, there are three essential requirements of a counter-
plan. (1) It must be competitive with the affirmative proposal, 
meeting any of the five definitions noted above. (2) It must be non-
topical. That is, it may not fulfill the requirements of the 
resolution. (3) It must be presented as a prima facie case which is 
capable of standing until refuted. 
Presumption and Burden of Proof 
As noted in the preceding paragraph, if the negative presents 
^ prima facie case they lose presumption and accept the burden of 
proof. There are, however, differences of opinion among theorists 
22 
Ziegler, p. 161. 
14 
as to the definition of presumption and the acceptance of the burden 
of proof. 
The term, "presumption", was first introduced by Bishop Whately 
who defined it as follows: 
There is a Presumption in favour of every existing 
institution. Many of these (we will suppose the 
majority) may be susceptible of alteration for 
the better; but still the "Burden of proof" lies with 
him who proposes an alteration; simply, on the ground 
that since a change is not a good in itself, he who 
demands a change should shew cause for it.^^ 
24 
Views since that time have been inconsistent. Even when there is 
an acknowledged need for a change in the status quo it is a need for 
25 
change and not for the specific change advocated by the affirmative. 
If we accept these traditional views of presumption we can then 
26 
say it operates in favor of the negative in a "standard" debate. 
With the introduction of a counterplan, the negative loses pre­
sumption and thus, an inherent advantage. 
A more flexible definition is offered by Cronkhite. He states 
that the party who initiates a dispute (the affirmative) automatically 
Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric (Boston: 1851), 79. 
24 
Gary Cronkhite, "The Locus of Persumption", Central States 
Speech Journal XVII (1966), 270-277. 
Austin J. Freeley, Decision by Debate (New York: 1963), p. 32. 
Newman, p. 14. 
15 
awards presumption to his opponent. The "occupation of ground or 
existence as status quo is only a frequently accompanying character­
istic accorded the presumption" (p. 273). If we accept this 
definition, the negative then maintains presumption when they 
employ a counterplan. 
General Systems Theory also has applicability to the assign­
ment of presumption. Lichtmann and Rohrer chastise traditionalists 
for accepting presumption as a decision rule. They say presumption 
can be used to identify the policy system which is accorded pre­
judgement but the standard necessary to overcome presumption must 
be specified as well. Rather than arbitrarily awarding presumption 
to the existing system it should be awarded to the system with the 
greater degree of certainty. Under these circumstances it is con­
ceivable that the locus of presumption could change within a debate 
as the uncertainty of a new plan (affirmative or counterplan) is 
diminished.^^ 
The assignment of presumption to one side determines that the 
opposing side must accept the burden of proof and present a prima 
facie case. Views on this are varied in the counterplan situation. 
27 
Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer, "A Systems Approach 
to Presumption and Burden of Proof", Issues (February and December, 
1974) in Advanced Debate, pp. 8-15. 
16 
Some theorists feel, as noted previously, that both affirmative 
and negative must present a prima facie case. As recently as 1975 
Wood stated that although the negative loses presumption by 
admitting there are problems in the status quo, the affirmative 
still has the burden of proof for the propostion. The only dif­
ference in the affirmative position is that they no longer need to 
debate the need issue. They must, however, still prove that the 
change, as stated in the proposition, is the best solution to the 
problem (p. 28). This location of burden of proof was earlier 
28 
advocated by Freeley. Another view of the locus of burden of 
proof in a counterplan debate is that it is jointly shared by the 
29 
affirmative and the negative. A fourth view considers burden of 
30 
proof as a requirement that every speaker support his assertions. 
As can be noted from the above, there has been a lack of con­
sistent clarity on these concepts with subsequent confusion for 
both debaters and judges, particularly when a counterplan is intro­
duced. Later in this paper current judging practices regarding 
presumption and burden of proof in a counterplan debate will be 
28 
Argumentation and Debate, p. 77. 
29 
Terry, p. 7. 
30 
Murphy and Ericson, p. 99. 
17 
examined in an attempt to reduce this ambiguity. 
Functions of the Counterplan 
The counterplan has been considered an effective negative 
strategy under the following conditions; (1) When a problem or 
31 
problems in the status quo have been generally recognized. (2) 
When the affirmative has delineated a situation that is more 
desirable than the status quo, but less desirable than the negative 
32 
alternative. ( 3 )  When the negative feels the affirmative has 
inaccurately defined the problem and/or their plan does not solve 
33 
the problem(s) of the status quo. (4) When the proposition calls 
34 
for specific action to be taken. ( 5 )  when case surprise is an 
effective strategy. 
31 
Roger E. Nebergall, "The Negative Counterplan", Speech 
Teacher, VI (1957), 217. 
32 
Allan J. Lichtman and Daniel M. Rohrer, "The Role of the 
Criteria Case in the Conceptual Framework of Academic Debate" in 
Modern Debate Case Techniques, p. 57. 
33 
Freeley, p. 214. 
34 
Russell R. Windes and Arthur Hastings, Argumentation and 
Advocacy (New York, 1967), p. 77. 
18 
The clash in a counterplan debate results from the negative 
attempts to prove the superiority of its plan. If the negative 
does not accept the affirmative's definition of the problem, the 
debate can dissolve into a no-clash situation with advocates arguing 
two different, unrelated plans. This has been the problem with many 
counterplan debates in the past and may partially explain why the 
counterplan has been looked upon with disfavor by theorists and 
judges alike. 
In the systems theory counterplan situation a clash occurs 
for two major reasons: (1) The negative will attempt to prove that 
its plan meets the two "competitive" criteria stated earlier in this 
paper while the affirmative will try to prove the opposite. (2) 
The negative will attempt to maximize the "costs" of the affirmative 
proposal and minimize the benefits. The net benefits sought in a 
policy system debate are "a function of both the probability that 
the system will achieve results and the values placed on those 
ii35 
results." The affirmative will attempt a similar analysis of the 
negative proposal. 
Structure 
The structuring of a traditional counterplan has not changed 
35 
Brock, et. al., p. 122. 
19 
markedly since Lambertson suggested the negative ask itself the 
following questions in setting up a counterplan. 
1. What are the limitations of the affirmative plan? 
2. What is the nature of the negative plan? 
3. How is it more workable than the affirmative plan? 
4. Why is it more desirable than the affirmative plan? 
5. How can it create fewer or less serious evils than the 
affirmative plan?36 
Moulton has suggested the negative attack should be structured 
in the following manner: (1) Grant the evils of the present system 
to the affirmative. These should, however, be expanded to the point 
where the affirmative plan can not solve the problems. The negative 
must, in addition, be prepared to meet the affirmative need for a 
change arguments. (2) Attack the affirmative solution. This may 
be done in several ways. The negative may show that the affirmative 
plan does not solve the problems addressed in the status quo, that 
the affirmative plan has more disadvantages than advantages, that 
the negative solution entails less serious disadvantages than the 
affirmative or that the affirmative plan is unworkable or impractical. 
(3) Present the new negative plan for comparison. After having 
enumerated the benefits of their plan, the negative should explain 
clearly why it is superior to the affirmative plan. (4) Be ready 
37 
to defend the plan against attack. 
36 
"Plan and Counterplan in a Question of Policy", p. 49. 
37 
Eugene R. Moulton, The Dynamics of Debate (New York, 1966), p. 
20 
One of the restrictions traditional theorists have placed on 
the negative in building their case is that "all negative arguments 
must be adapted to the specific features of the particular affir-
38 
mative plan." A discrepancy exists here because other theorists 
feel the negative may redefine the need. If they do, they must be 
sure that the need, as redefined, is perfectly integrated with 
their counterplan. 
In a counterplan situation, the negative has several advantages. 
•30 
They may choose which i^ue or issues to contest as well as 
which disadvantages they wish to advance (p. 244). The major 
advantage is that they can force the affirmative to change roles 
and debate on negative ground. If this happens, it is likely 
that the affirmative, in defending itself against negative attacks, 
will spend insufficient time rebuilding its case. Then the negative 
can argue in rebuttal that even if the counterplan is rejected, the 
affirmative's proposal should not be accepted because it has been 
inadequately supported. 
38 
Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, Decision by Debate 
(New York, 1963), p. 244. 
39 
Ibid., p. 245. 
40 
Wood, p. 124. 
21 
Systems theory enhances the strategic value of the counterplan 
by allowing the negative greater lattitude in the selection of their 
plan and arguments and greater creativity in designing a competitive 
counterplan. In addition, it provides a rationale for assessing 
41 
the legitimacy of counterplans. 
The Affirmative Response to the Counterplan 
In the past, it has been alleged that in a counterplan situation, 
the first affirmative constructive speech which deals primarily 
with the need issue is a wasted speech. This is incorrect, because 
42 
any plan advanced by the affirmative must solve the specified need. 
In many instances that speech also provides the ground on which the 
debate is to continue. 
In responding to the counterplan one of the worst things the 
affirmative can do is assume that its obligations have changed. They 
must utilize the same basic strategies employed under any negative 
attack. That is, they must uphold the burden of proof, maintain 
the attack on the status quo and attempt to narrow the debate. 
In a traditional debate, if the negative has conceded the problems 
of the status quo, the second affirmative constructive speaker should 
41 
Brock, et. al., pp. 178-180. 
42 
McBath, p. 115. 
22 
then review his colleague's analysis of the need issue and, if the 
negative has suggested that there are other defects in the present 
system, either "deny that the defects exist or suggest that the 
43 
present system is taking care of them." It is conceivable that 
the alleged defects cited by the negative will be outside the problem 
area defined by the affirmative. 
The affirmative, must then move to a direct comparison of the 
two plans. The first criterion is "Which plan best meets the need?" 
The affirmative has the advantage here because they have specified 
the need and carefully integrated their plan to solve that need. 
The next step is to compare relative costs, workability, 
practicality and efficiency of the two plans (p. 123). If the 
affirmative can prove their plan is better or if both the affirmative 
plan and the counterplan can be adopted simultaneously, it should 
result in an affirmative win. 
The affirmative can lose if they misanalyze the proposition or 
forget to uphold the burden of proof, both of which could be reasons 
for a loss in any debate. A loss could result if the affirmative lets 
the negative shift its ground. The affirmative has defined the 
problem and the debate must stay in that "arena" or there will be no 
clash. Losing the offense could also result in an affirmative loss. 
43 
Wood, p. 122. 
23 
They must keep their case uppermost in the judge's mind and be 
careful not to get into an exclusive position of defending against 
the counterplan (p. 124). 
The following is a description of the major emphasis in each 
of the affirmative and the negative speeches in a counterplan debate. 
lAC -- The affirmative proposal is needed. 
INC -- Agree that something must be done. The 
negative counterplan is better than the 
affirmative proposal. 
2AC -- The affirmative proposal is superior to the 
negative counterplan. 
2NC -- The affirmative proposal would be disadvan­
tageous. 
INR -- Refutation of alleged affirmative advantages 
over the negative counterplan. 
lAR -- Refutation of alleged disadvantages. Refu­
tation of negative claims of advantages. 
2NR -- Refutation of unresolved arguments... 
2AR -- Refutation of unresolved arguments. 
Decision Rules 
When assigning a decision in a counterplan debate, the judge 
will, of course, consider many of the factors mentioned earlier in 
this paper, presumption and burden of proof being of prime impor­
tance. The first criterion is "Which team, through logical argu­
mentation, has shown that its plan is better?" If the two plans 
appear equal the judge must then turn to a second criterion. In a 
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Arthur B. Miller and Remo P. Fausti, Elements of Deliberative 
Debating (Belmont, Calif., 1969), p. 56. 
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traditional debate, this may be the need issue. The affirmative 
will receive the decision if they have sufficiently proved the 
need for a change. Should the opposite be true, the ballot would 
not be a vote for the negative but against the affirmative. The 
negative must prove that its plan alone is superior while the 
affirmative has the option of proving that its plan or the simul­
taneous enactment of both plans is .the superior option. There may 
be situations in which neither team has established the inadequacy 
of the status quo. The judge will then have to vote on the better 
policy. In any case, the judge must make a decision on how the 
debate was presented and not on how he wishes it had been pre-
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sented. 
Lichtman and Rohrer have suggested that judges who utilize 
presumption as a decision rule do so erroneously because the assign­
ment of presumption is only the first step. A standard of critical 
assessment should then be applied to factors such as the extent of 
the change and the state of the status quo. If such a system were 
established, the judges would have a "value" number system from which 
to work. This could facilitate decision-making and produce greater 
consistency in judging.'^® 
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pp. 22-43. 
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In sunmary, when the negative presents a counterplan, they 
may employ either traditional or systems theory analysis. If 
they utilize a traditional approach they must first deal with the 
analysis of need presented by the affirmative. Regardless of 
which type of analysis is used, the counterplan must be competitive, 
non-topical and prima facie. Much of the clash in the debate will 
result from the negative's attempts to prove the superiority and/or 
the competitiveness of their plan. 
The negative which employs a counterplan has several advantages. 
For example, they may choose the issues and advantages they wish 
to advance and attempt to force the affirmative to debate on 
negative ground. In defeating any negative advantages, the affir­
mative must uphold the burden of proof, maintain the attack on 
the status quo, attempt to narrow the debate and prove the super­
iority of their plan. 
Since presumption is usually considered to rest with the status 
quo, its location can become a confused and confusing issue in the 
counterplan debate. According to Lichtman and Rohrer, presumption 
should not be used as a decision rule. If only one criterion needs 
to be used it should be the superiority of the plan. 
Thus far, this paper has dealt with the theory of the counter-
plan debate as expressed in texts and magazine articles. These 
views can be compared and contrasted with those of the National 
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Debate Tournament judges who represent contemporary practice in 
counterplanning. 
ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL DEBATE TOURNAMENT JUDGES' SHEETS 
For the past four years, prior to the National Debate Tourna-
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ment, the Tournament Committee has sent out a questionnaire to 
all coaches and guest judges who would be judging at that tourna­
ment. From six to eight questions have been asked on debate theory 
and technique; however, the questions have not precluded additional 
statements by the respondents. Some of the questions asked have 
been: "What role does cross-examination play in your evaluation 
of a debate?" "Do you see yourself as a chooser of policy systems, 
as a judge of 'who did a better job of debating', or in some other 
role as a judge?" "Under what, if any, circumstances will you vote 
negative when no disadvantages are carried by the negative? Why?" 
Responses to the questions were then printed in a National Debate 
Tournament Booklet of Judges which was made available to the par­
ticipants at each tournament. 
The coaches, who were from all nine American Forensic Association 
Districts in the United States, had teams competing in that tourna­
ment. Additionally, guest judges had been selected because of their 
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reputations as outstanding decision-makers. The responses of these 
National Debate Tournament judges should be representative of 
current debate theory and contemporary judging practices at the 
intercollegiate level. On this assumption, responses to relevant 
questions on those philosophy sheets have been analyzed with the 
intent of obtaining an overview of the most current counterplan 
theory. In analyzing the answers to the selected questions per­
centile figures have been computed, wherever possible. When the 
numbers of specific responses were small and resulting percentage 
figures would be misleading, a composite view of the stated 
philosophies is presented instead. 
1977 Booklet of Judges - The Counterplan 
The most comprehensive question dealing with the counterplan 
was asked on the questionnaire for the 1977 National Debate Tourna­
ment, April 15-18 at Southwest Missouri State College in Springfield, 
Missouri. This question was; "How are your judging procedures 
affected by counterplans? What must the negative do to sustain the 
counterplan? What must the affirmative do to defeat the counterplan?" 
Of the eighty-seven judges whose philosophy sheets were in­
cluded in that booklet, eighty-four addressed themselves to the 
question in varying degrees of comprehensiveness. Unless specified 
otherwise, percentile figures have been based on those eighty-four 
judges' and coaches' comments. 
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Though the question did not solicit an opinion of counterplans 
per se, seven of the judges (8.3%) said that they did not like 
them. In general, they felt counterplan theory and practice had 
not been adequately defined and, as a consequence, debaters did not 
use this strategy effectively. One critic said counterplans were 
unwise because the negative had to give up presumption and in­
herency. Only two of the judges said that they had heard counter-
48 plans infrequently. In a few instances judges stated their 
positive reactions toward counterplans but most simply addressed 
the questions. 
"What must the negative do to sustain the counterplan?" 
Since the counterplan is initiated in a debate as a negative 
strategy, this portion of the question was analyzed first. The 
following is an overview of the counterplan drawn from the judging 
philosophy sheets. 
When the negative elects to use a counterplan, it must be 
presented in the first negative constructive speech. The counter-
plan must be unambiguous, specifically detailed, fully developed 
and formulated in a manner similar to that of the affirmative plan 
in the areas of procedures, enforcement, etc. In other words, it 
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In analyzing the bookets from the past four years, this type 
of response was found occurring most frequently in District 4 which 
includes Iowa, North and South Dakota and Minnesota; however numbers 
are too small to draw any definitive conclusions. 
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must be a prima facie case. The counterpTan must offer a distinct 
alternative solution to that of the affirmative. 
The two most frequently mentioned requirements for a counter-
plan were that the plan be non-topical (72.6% of the respondents) 
and competitive (67.9%) with the affirmative plan. Other re­
quirements included solvency, superiority to the affirmative plan, 
and more advantageous and/or less disadvantageous than the 
affirmative. 
Due, in part, to an apparent disagreement over the definition 
of "competitive" fourty-four of those mentioning it as a criterion 
(77.2%) defined the term. The definitions varied according to the 
judge's bias toward traditional (54.8%) or systems theory debate 
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(32.5%). The remaining judges gave definitions which were either 
unclear or could not be classified under either theory. One judge 
gave his definitions for both perspectives. 
Twenty-two of those with traditional viewpoints (50%) said 
simply that the counterplan must deal with the same problem area 
as the affirmative plan while 41.7 percent stated that it must meet 
Judging biases were determined as follows: (1) Some judges 
stated that they employed traditional or systems theory approaches. 
(2) If a judge's comments dealt with aspects of traditional theory 
such as accepting the affirmative definition of need, they were 
considered traditionalists. (3) When terminology used or areas of 
analysis were a part of systems theory, the judges were classified 
as being of that philosophy. 
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the affirmative advantages. This was specified still further by 
20.8 percent who said the counterplan must accrue the same lives 
saved (or more) and/or be competitive in terms of money spent. 
Of the two systems theory definitions of "competitive" --
mutually exclusive and more desirable than both plans implemented 
simultaneously--the latter was the more frequent response (85.7%). 
Mutually exclusive was mentioned by 57.1 percent of the systems 
theory judges. Some judges mentioned both definitions. Other 
systems theory judges either stated they judged competitiveness 
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"according to the systems theory definition" or gave rationale 
such as "must equal affirmative significance and possess additive 
advantages that exceed the affirmative advantages or the dis­
advantages of the counterplan." Two of the judges said that the 
plans must be mutually exclusive but due to other conunents they did 
(or did not) make it was not feasible to classify them within the 
systems theory perspective and consequently their responses were 
not classified in either theory. 
Though the term, "substitutional", has been considered by 
some as a definition of "competitive," four judges listed the two 
terms as separate entities. Some thought the negative's definition 
of competitive was a debatable issue. Others said they would deter­
mine the competitiveness of the negative policy by weighing the 
benefits and costs. 
50 
Unless indicated otherwise, all quoted statements in this 
section of the paper are from NOT judges. 
If the counterplan is judged from a traditional viewpoint, 
it must "demonstrate solvency of 100 percent of the problem area 
isolated by the affirmative." In doing so, the negative must 
assume the same plan-meet-need burden of proof as the affirmative 
but must do so in a superior fashion. This can be demonstrated 
through the assignment of significant disadvantages to the af­
firmative case. 
Several of the judges (21.2%) stated that the counterplan must 
be the superior option. "Superior" can mean that it is superior to 
the affirmative plan or superior to the solution called for in the 
resolution. It does not mean that the negative must meet all of 
the affirmative advantages but rather, that they must do so in a 
superior way. 
The responses on advantages and disadvantages were extremely 
varied because they could and did deal with any of the four possible 
areas: affirmative advantages, negative advantages, affirmative 
disadvantages, negative disadvantages. The most cohesive group 
of answers dealt with negative advantages. The general overview 
of this area was as follows: The most frequent response (68% of 
those responding on this issue) was that the negative policy should 
accrue more or better advantages. Sixteen percent said this was 
unnecessary. Some judges felt that all affirmative advantages must 
be achieved; but two judges said "nearly all" was sufficient. 
One judge said that advantages could only be accrued from parts of 
the plan which were competitive with the affirmative proposal while 
another stated that a substantially different alternative should 
be used to meet the affirmative advantages. Two judges said that 
the advantages should be based on a departure from the resolution. 
Little major consensus was found in this area. 
In summary, generalizing from the responses included in the 
Booklet of Judges, the counterplan must be non-topical, deal 
effectively with the advantages accrued by the affirmative, have 
fewer disadvantages, solve the problems originally designated by 
the affirmative and be the superior option. When considered 
from a traditional perspective, competitiveness was seen to be 
achieved most advantageously by dealing with the affirmative problem 
area. From a systems approach, a competitive counterplan was most 
frequently seen as one which is more desireable than the two plans 
existing simultaneously. 
Presumption which usually is accorded to the status quo, be­
comes an important issue in a counterplan debate because the status 
quo is not being defended. As a consequence thirty-three (37.9%) 
of the judges stated their opinions about the locus of presumption. 
One of those statements was too ambiguous to be included in the 
analysis. 
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Of the thirty-two known judge's opinions about presumption, 
sixteen (50%) said that the negative forfeits presumption when 
using a counterplan thus giving them an additional burden, the 
burden of proof which they did not have before. One of those said 
it was granted to the affirmative because it then became the 
established system (the developed policy against the negative 
alternative). In direct contradiction to this, eight (25%) 
said that presumption did not shift. Some of these judges viewed 
presumption as resting against the adoption of the resolution or 
against the specific affirmative case rather than with the status quo. 
Several other opinions were also expressed. Four of the judges 
considered presumption as resting with the team whose plan presented 
the least risk or the least radical change. Others said the location 
of presumption should be debated in the round if it was critical 
to the team's stand. One judge felt that "because neither team 
enjoys presumption it becomes an irrelevant concept in the round." 
Another said it was confusing and still another said that he was 
undecided as to its location. 
What must the affirmative do to defeat the counterplan? 
Of the eighty-seven judges who stated their philosophies on 
counterplanning, fifty-six (60.1%) responded specifically to the 
portion of the question dealing with affirmative strategies in a 
counterplan situation. 
In a counterplan debate, the affirmative must continue to 
perform "normal" affirmative duties. They must present a prima facie 
case, maintain the burden of proof, and prove that the resolution 
should be adopted. Their duties are increased, however, because 
they must go beyond an extension of their own case and prove that 
the counterplan should not be adopted. 
The two issues considered as most debatable by the affirmative 
were non-topicality and non-competiveness. Next in importance, 
according to references on the philosophy sheets, was the advantage-
disadvantage issue (47.8%). The fourth most frequently mentioned 
issue was plan superiority (24.6%) which was not specifically defined 
in most instances and could be determined by several factors. Few 
of the systems theory judges mentioned specific affirmative attacks. 
The affirmative may show that the negative has not met any of 
the non-topicality and competitiveness requirements discussed pre­
viously in this section of the paper. Topicality can be considered 
with a bias in favor of the affirmative. It may be necessary to 
debate the non-competiveness of the counterplan from a theoretical 
perspective as well as from the more standard approaches. 
To win the advantage-disadvantage issue, the affirmative should 
deal with the disadvantages of the counterplan. They may prove 
that the counterplan has unique disadvantages, more disadvantages 
than the affirmative plan, or more significant disadvantages. 
This was the response of fifteen of the judges who addressed them­
selves to this issue (45.5%). Proving added affirmative advantages 
and sustaining original advantages was considered a winning 
strategy by 33.3 percent of the judges. Once the affirmative has 
shown that their plan can meet their advantages, they can refute the 
counterplan advantages. Then they can show (1) that the negative 
cannot accrue the same level of advantages through on-balance com­
parison, (2) that their plan has fewer disadvantages than the counter-
plan and/or (3) that the advantage-disadvantage ratio for the 
affirmative plan is better than the negative ratio. 
The affirmative must defend the superiority of their approach. 
They may show that their plan is the better means of achieving their 
advantages, that fewer disadvantages are entailed, and/or that given 
the limited resources available, their plan constitutes a better 
expenditure of those resources. 
Though not mentioned as frequently as those issues above, 
solvency can be another issue in the debate. The affirmative must 
illustrate their ability to solve the problems more effectively 
than the counterplan because the final decision for some judges is 
based on which team sustains solvency in a superior fashion. 
When the debate is viewed, and debated, from a systems theory 
approach, the affirmative must defend the workability and advantages 
of their plan and compare or refute the negative advantages. They 
should employ a cost-benefit comparative analysis wherever feasible. 
In some instances, they may be able to prove that the counterplan 
can be subsumed under the affirmative plan. 
Other important affirmative strategies are as follows; (1) 
Make the negative position seem less rational and/or desireable 
than the resolution. (2) Argue on the basis of argumentation theory 
and real-world policy making. (3) Argue that the added advantages 
the negative claims can occur or are occurring under the status quo. 
How are your judging procedures affected by the presentation of a 
counterplan? 
In responding to this portion of the question a frequent comment 
was: "I reach for more flow material" because the debaters are 
dealing with arguments for and against two separate plans rather 
than for and against one plan. When a systems approach is used, 
the problem becomes further confounded because both case and plan 
structures differ since the affirmative problem area need not be 
accepted. 
There was little consistency in the judging procedures expressed 
by the respondents. Several said they viewed the counterplan simply 
as another policy option or another issue in the round. The next 
most frequent response was that they tended to judge the two plans 
comparatively. Some said the criteria for acceptance or rejection 
of the counterplan were left to the debaters in each round. 
Many other judging procedures were mentioned which could serve 
as guidelines for potential counterplan use. They were as follows: 
(1) Since the counterplan is a controversial strategy, debaters 
should introduce arguments which support their views of counter-
plan theory. These should then be related to their specific strategies 
or issues. (2) The judge enters with no preconceived view of what 
is best (i.e., no presumption) and evaluates the teams on the basis 
of the arguments in the round. (3) The issues of competitiveness 
and advantages become more important than in a "standard" round. 
(4) The choices between teams becomes narrower and therefore minor 
factors get promoted in a decision. (5) Arguments which support or 
refute are evaluated by the same criteria as in any other debate. 
(6) In the end, the question is which "resolution" appears to be 
better. (7) If the judge has any doubts or reservations about the 
counterplan, the ballot will go affirmative. (8) If the negative 
has solvency, advantages, and competitiveness, the debate will re­
volve around a comparison of advantages and disadvantages. (9) In 
the event that neither policy is a winner, the decision goes to the 
plan which advocates the least change. (10) If the negative argues 
the case and wins the theoretical issues related to the counterplan, 
the decision is based on the political decision-making model, focused 
around the traditional stock issues. 
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Of the eighty-seven judges in the study, sixty-seven (77%) 
listed a series of 3 or 4 critical areas or issues on which the 
debate should focus. By far, the most important of these were 
topicality and competitiveness. The seven most frequently mentioned 
areas are listed below in order of descending importance as in­
ferred from incidence of mention. 
1. Topicality 
2. Competitiveness 
3. Added, superior, or unique advantages 
4. Solvency 
5. Mutually exclusive 
6. Superior option 
7. Disadvantages to plan. 
Other voting issues mentioned were inherency, plan entails less 
risk, counterplan does/does not preclude affirmative plan, sub-
stitutable, same or similar advantages, diminished case significance 
and ability to argue stock issues. In all, fourteen different 
critical areas were noted by the judges. 
To win the counterplan debate, the negative must win all of the three 
or four areas deemed critical by that particular judge. The af­
firmative need win only one of the areas against the counterplan. 
A problem exists here because the debater, unless he has been 
judged by the individual previously or has one of the judge's 
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philosophy sheets available, does not know which of the areas or 
issues he must win. Some consistent list of criteria would be 
helpful. At present, the debaters can only hope that they will 
select the right areas or that the judge will decide the critical 
areas as they are debated by the two teams. 
1974 and 1975 Booklets of Judges - Conditional Counterplans 
During the 1973-74 and 1974-75 debate seasons there was con­
siderable controversy over the conditional counterplan, a strategy 
in which the negative upholds both the status quo and the counterplan 
through an "even if" argument. That is, "even if" the status quo 
were not functioning properly, the negative counterplan would be 
better than the affirmative plan. To provide teams with knowledge 
of the judges' bias on this case structure, the question, "How do 
you generally react to conditional counterplans?" was included on 
the National Debate Tournament questionnaire. 
To analyze the data from these philosophy sheets, a 5-point 
accept-reject scale was used which included "accept, accept with 
reservations, neutral or non-commital, reject with reservations, 
and reject." An example of a statement classified as "accept with 
reservations" was "I accept those that are offered to attack the 
significance of the affirmative case." A "reject with reservations" 
response was "I am not particularly receptive to conditional counter-
plans. . .[but] I have voted on [them]." 
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In 1974, nineteen of the seventy-six judges did not respond 
to the question, discussed the counterplan instead of the conditional 
counterplan or said that they had not heard any conditional counter-
plans; therefore, the philosophy sheets of these judges were not 
considered. This left fifty-seven judges with valid answers. The 
results are shown in Table I. 
TABLE I. 1974 NATIONAL DEBATE TOURNAMENT 
Reaction to Conditional Counterplan Number Percent 
Accept 19 33.3 
Accept with reservations 11 19.3 
Neutral 3 5.0 
Reject with reservations 12 21.1 
Reject 12 21.1 
As can be noted, a slightly larger percentage (52.6%) accepted 
the conditional counterplan than rejected it (42.4%). 
The philosophy sheets for this year were the only ones which 
listed years of coaching experience. Cox, in a similar study of 
these philosophy sheets found that the majority (71.8%) of those 
who rejected the conditional counterplan had 6 or more years coaching 
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experience while those who accepted the conditional counterplan were 
about equally divided between coaches with 1 to 5 years experience 
v 5 1  
(51.5%) and those with 6 or more years (48.5) 
When the question was again asked in 1975, seven of the eighty-
four judges solicited for comments (8.3%) did not respond to the 
question in contrast to 13.1 percent who had not responded the previous 
year. Three of the ballots could not be classified. Therefore, 
seventy-four ballots were utilized in this study. The results and 
comparisons with the preceding year are listed in Table II. 
TABLE II. 1975 NATIONAL DEBATE TOURNAMENT 
Reaction to 
Conditional Counterplan Number Percent Number 
Percent 
Change 
Accept 25 33.8 +8 + .5 
Accept with reservations 7 9.5 -4 -12.5 
Neutral 3 4.1 — — 
Reject with reservations 10 13.5 -2 - 7.6 
Reject 29 39.2 +17 +18.1 
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J. Robert Cox, "A Study of Judging Philosophies of the 
Participants of the National Debate Tournament," Journal of the 
American Forensic Association XI (1974), p. 69. 
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Apparently judges were conmitting themselves more in their 
views of the conditional counterplan. The trend was toward re­
jection of this strategy rather than toward acceptance though the 
difference between the two views was not large (43.3% accepting, 
52.7% rejecting). However, in comparison with the previous year's 
totals it can be noted that both the decrease in acceptance and the 
increase in rejection were approximately 10 percent. 
Some of the judges felt that a counterplan was the same, or 
utilized the same strategies, whether it was conditional or straight 
and must be debated as such. They stated that the conditional 
counterplan must be shown to be a coherent policy system, not con­
tingent on the adoption of the resolution. For the negative to win 
with a conditional counterplan significance must be demonstrated and 
not assumed from general evidence, "plan objectives must go beyond 
mere observations" and the superiority of the negative approach must 
be demonstrated. Some indicated conditional counterplans needed 
more care and preparation than was usually given them. 
When a conditional counterplan is used, the affirmative grants 
the negative inherency and significance. Superiority of their 
approach can be demonstrated by proving additional advantages, the 
absence of affirmative disadvantages, superior solvency, or a less 
radical departure from the status quo with less risk and greater 
predictability involved. 
Several of those who rejected the conditional counterplan did 
so because they felt time restrictions precluded the debate of three 
positions. Another common view was that the conditional counter-
plan was inconsistent with the policy system approach in that the 
negative "avoid[s] the advocation of a substitute system from the 
perspective of actually, not conditionally, choosing a course of 
action." Others said they preferred the negative to argue a con­
sistent philosophical position and in the conditional counterplan 
debate they were unsure of what the negative policy system was. 
One judge considered the counterplan a weak method of attack 
and the conditional counterplan an even weaker method. Other views 
expressed were: "It's a cop-out for the negative because they seem 
to want the best of both worlds." The negative is risking too 
much while they try to maintain presumption. "It is a horrendous 
loss of presumption." "I don't feel obligated to listen to a 
negative rationale for a change as well as a justification of the 
status quo." 
Typical comments of the most opposed were: "Since I can't cast 
conditional ballots, I don't care for conditional counterplans." 
"A counterplan is like death--quite a commitment. You cannot be 
a little dead, a little pregnant or a 'conditional' counterplan." 
Those who were willing to accept the conditional counterplan 
less frequently explained their reasons. Some felt that because 
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debate is for discussing debatable issues it was acceptable. Others 
said that the conditional counterplan should be considered in the 
light of policy options. Those who qualified their answers said the 
conditional counterplan was acceptable if it was presented as a 
"conditional" counterplan, if it was designed to meet only part of 
the affirmative plan or if it was offered as an attack against the 
significance of the affirmative case. One judge stated that the 
negative should not present a conditional counterplan and then attempt 
to drop it in rebuttals. 
1976 Booklet of Judges 
The 1976 questionnaires did not contain a question on counter-
plans, however, some judges stated their counterplanning preferences 
under the question, "Must the negative, like the affirmative, 
support a specific policy proposal? Why or why not?" 
There were fifteen responses on the conditional counterplan. 
Of those, seven said they would accept a conditional counterplan, 
two would accept them with reservations and six rejected them. If 
conclusions can be drawn from these few philosophy sheets, it would 
appear that the trend toward acceptance of the conditional counter-
plan had increased slightly from 1975. 
The reverse was true on the 1977 philosophy sheets, however. 
Of twenty-two judges who commented on the conditional counterplan, 
seven (31.8%) said they would accept them, while the same number 
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(7) said they were not receptive to conditional counterplans and 
eight (36.4%) said they would reject them. Thus, the percentage 
rejecting the conditional counterplan increased greatly. 
Counterplan 
The response on the 1976 questionnaire was the opposite for 
the counterplan. Of the twenty-three judges who commented on the 
counterplan, eighteen (78.3%) were in favor of the strategy. Only 
one judge indicated he would not support a counterplan while three 
(13%) said that they didn't particularly like them. This last 
figure can be compared with 8.3 percent who, in 1977, said they 
didn't care for counterplans. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
When a counterplan is employed, the nature of debate changes. 
It moves from a bipolar situation with a single solution to one 
which permits a multi-sided examination of the problem. The 
question changes from "Should we have international control of world 
resources?" to "Should we have international control of world re­
sources or something else?" As with the affirmative's comparative ad­
vantage, alternative justification, and criteria cases, the counter-
plans has enlarged the scope of debate. It can be considered the 
embodiment of a negative justification argument. With such theo­
retical growth, debate has become more complicated and more in­
tellectually challenging. 
Unfortunately debate theory has lagged behind debate practice. 
For example, the 1975 edition of Strategic Debate said counter-
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plans were uncommon, yet in practice, counterplans were sufficiently 
common that judges at that year's National Debate Tournament were 
asked their opinions of the conditional counterplan. Those opinions 
would serve as guidelines for the debaters at the same tourna­
ment. 
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Wood, p. 121. 
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As with any change within a structure, guidelines for implemen­
tation must be established if counterplans are to be utilized ef­
fectively. In the absence of comprehensive guidelines for counter-
plan debate, as it exists today, literature and judging practices 
have been examined with the intent of formulating a more concrete 
view of the counterplan debate. 
In reviewing the context of this paper, it can be noted that 
two debate theories exist which can be applied to the counterplan. 
The first of these, traditional theory, has been the predominant 
view and is the perspective of the majority of the texts. When 
utilizing the traditional theory approach, the counterplan debater 
will focus on the need issue as defined by the affirmative. In 
the more recent of the two approaches, systems theory, analysis deals 
with multiple causality and equifinality. This perspective, though 
introduced only five years ago, has gained acceptance by one-third 
of the coaches and judges at the 1977 National Debate Tournament. 
These individuals represent a major influence in debate practice 
today. Systems theory has provided the debater increased options, 
over and above those already afforded by the counterplan. 
Theorists have said that a counterplan must be prima facie, 
non-topical and competitive. A competitive counterplan may be 
functionally competitive, structurally or philosophically competitive, 
mutually exclusive or more desireable when implemented alone than 
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when enacted with the affirmative plan. The judges have indicated 
acceptance of these definitions and further defined them. 
Other issues in a counterplan debate include solvency, superiority 
and advantages-disadvantages. Judges have substantiated and qualified 
theorists views of solvency. They have stressed the importance of 
proving the superiority of the counterplan and stated ways in which 
this can be accomplished, primarily through the use of advantages 
and disadvantages. Of the 3 issues stated above, the judges' most 
important contribution has been in the delineation of advantage-
disadvantage attacks. Though a variety of strategies have been 
mentioned, the predominant view is that the debater must prove his 
plan is more advantageous than that of the affirmative and show the 
disadvantages of their plan. 
Theorists have been responsible for the structures of the counter-
plan debate, while both they and the judges have specified strategies 
which may be used by the affirmative and negative teams. In general, 
the strategies noted by the judges have been more specific. 
The location of presumption can be a factor in the decision 
reached on a counterplan debate. As defined by Whatley, presumption 
rests with the negative. Views on the location of presumption in 
a "standard" debate have never been consistent and they are even 
more inconsistent in a counterplan debate; however, one-half of the 
judges noted, said the negative forfeits presumption in a counter-
plan situation. 
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The conditional counterplan, an alternative to the "standard" 
counterplan, has elicited mixed responses from judges. Though 
views fluctuate, judges tend to be about equally divided in their 
reactions. 
If the two debate theories, traditional and systems, are to 
continue to be utilized in counterplan debate, proponents of each 
must be knowledgeable about the other theory as well so that either 
style of counterplan can be debated effectively and judged with 
expertise. To assist in understanding the similarities and dif­
ferences the following chart has been prepared from material in 
this paper. 
Comparison of Counterplan Judging Requirements 
According to Traditional and Systems Theory 
General 
Traditional 
Particular problem and 
solution 
Systems Theory 
Multiple causes and 
interaction 
Affirmative Need Accepted or accepted Need not be accepted 
in part 
Competitive Functionally Competi- Mutually exclusive, 
tive, structurally or cannot exist simul-
philosophically com- taneously with affir-
petitive, deals with mative plan 
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Traditional Systems Theory 
same problem areas as 
affirmative 
Meet affirmative advantages 
Other Requirements Solvency 
Non-topical 
Prima facie 
Clash Superior option 
Meets competitiveness 
definitions 
Advantages-
Disadvantages 
Affirmative must 
defend 
Achieve affirmative 
advantages 
Accrue more or better advantages 
Fewer disadvantages 
Workability 
Superior 
Fewer disadvantages 
More advantages 
Cost-benefit comparison 
Show counterplan can be 
subsumed 
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Traditional Systems Theory 
Presumption Rests with status quo Rests with system with 
greater degree of certainty 
Percentage of judges 54.8% 32.5% 
generally employing 
these approaches in 
1977. 
Counterplan theory is still in its infancy, but by synthesizing 
judge's comments with theory it is possible to establish a new 
theoretical base. Though in some instances, conflicting views have 
not precipitated conclusive definitions or strategies, they are never­
theless facilitative. The debater and/or judge can either circumvent 
or anticipate those discrepancies. To promote proficient counterplan 
debates, however, theoretical approaches in textbooks must be updated 
so that debaters and coaches may have easy accessibility to a com­
plete and comprehensive theoretical background of the counterplan. 
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